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Abstract—Voice interfaces and assistants implemented by var-
ious services have become increasingly sophisticated, powered by
increased availability of data. However, users’ audio data needs
to be guarded while enforcing data-protection regulations, such
as the GDPR law and the COPPA law. To check the unauthorized
use of audio data, we propose an audio auditor for users to audit
speech recognition models. Specifically, users can check whether
their audio recordings were used as a member of the model’s
training dataset or not. In this paper, we focus our work on
a DNN-HMM-based automatic speech recognition model over
the TIMIT audio data. As a proof-of-concept, the success rate
of participant-level membership inference can reach up to 90%
with eight audio samples per user, resulting in an audio auditor.
Index Terms—Membership inference attack, machine learning,
ASR, IoT.
I. INTRODUCTION
The automatic speech recognition (ASR) system is widely
adopted on Internet of Things (IoT) devices [1], [2]. The IoT
voice services competition among Apple, Microsoft, and Ama-
zon is continuously heating up the smart speaker market [3].
In parallel, the privacy concerns about the ASR system and
unauthorized access to user’s audio are of great awareness
for customers. Privacy policies and regulations, such as the
General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) [4] and the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) [5], have
been enforced to regulate personal data processing. Specif-
ically, the Right to be Forgotten [6] law allows customers
to prevent third-party voice services from continuously using
their data [7]. However, the murky privacy and security
boundary can thwart IoT’s trustworthiness [8], [9] and many
IoT devices attempt to sniff and analyze the audio captured
in real-time without user’s consent [10]. Most recently, on
WeChat, an enormously popular messaging platform within
China and worldwide, a scammer camouflaged to voice like
an acquaintance by spoofing her or his voice [11]. Therefore,
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it is important to develop techniques that enable auditing the
use of customers’ audio data in ASR models.
In this paper, we designed and evaluated an audio au-
ditor to help users determine whether their audio data had
been used without authorization to train an ASR model. The
targeted ASR model used in this paper is a DNN-HMM-
based speech-to-text model. With an audio signal input, this
model transcribes speech into written text. The auditor audits
this target model with an intent to infer participant-level
membership. The auditor will behave differently depending
on if it is transcribing audio from within its training set or
transcribing audio from other datasets. Thus, one can analyze
the transcriptions and use the outputs to train a binary classifier
as the auditor. As our primary focus is to infer participant-level
membership, speaker-related information is filtered out while
analyzing the transcription outputs (see details in Section III).
Participant-level membership inference on textual data has
been recently studied [12]. However, in this work, we target
an ASR model, instead of a text-generation model. The time-
series audio data is significantly more complex than the textual
data, causing feature patterns to be greatly varied [13]. Further-
more, current IoT applications demonstrate significantly higher
security and privacy impacts than most verbal applications
in learning tasks [14], [15]. In doing so, firstly, we assume
a different auditing scenario. To reproduce a target model
close to ASR systems in practice, we use multi-task learning,
which includes audio feature extraction, DNN learning, HMM
learning, and an n-gram language model with natural language
processing. Secondly, the auditor has black-box access to the
target model which only outputs one final transcription result.
Additionally, the auditor can audit the model by simultane-
ously providing multiple audio inputs supplied from the same
user, instead of just one. Thirdly, we extract a different set of
features from the model’s outputs. Instead of using the rank
lists of several top output results, we only use one text output
with the highest posterior and the length of input audio frames.
Our participant-level membership auditing method achieves
high performance on the TIMIT dataset. The auditing accuracy
results reach over 90% while the F1-score reaches 95% when
125 speaker records are used to train the auditor model. Even
when training with 25 users, the resulting accuracy is approx-
imately 85%. The auditor is also effective in auditing ASR
models with different numbers of audio queries from the same
individual. When the speaker audits the target model with
more than one audio sample (one-audio sample membership
inference success rate approaches to random guessing), the
success rate is significantly boosted, reaching up to 90% with
eight audio samples per user.
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2Fig. 1: An advanced ASR system. The ASR system has three main steps: (1) the preprocessing step extracts features to
represent the raw audio data, (2) the DNN training step trains the acoustic model and calculates the pseudo-posteriors, and (3)
the decoding step aims to map the predicted symbol combinations to texts and output the transcription results with the highest
score.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Automatic Speech Recognition Model
The DNN-HMM-based acoustic model is popular in the
current automatic speech recognition (ASR) system [16]. As
defined by [17], the ASR system contains a preprocessing step,
model training step, and decoding step as displayed in Fig-
ure 1. The preprocessing step performs the feature processing
and labeling for an audio input. In this paper, the audio frame
is processed using the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) to
extract information from the frequency domain, namely Mel-
Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCCs) as features. Forced
alignment is applied on the raw audio inputs to extract the
text label which is processed and used in training our acoustic
model. We train an acoustic model on a DNN. The acoustic
model outputs posterior probabilities for all HMM states which
are processed in the decoding step mapping posterior proba-
bilities to a sequence of text. The language model contained
within the decoder provides a language probability which is
used by the decoder to re-evaluate the acoustic score to the
most suited language [18]. The final transcription text is the
sequence with the highest score.
B. Membership Inference Attack
Membership inference attack aims to determine whether a
specific data sample is within the training set by training a
series of shadow models constituting the attack model [19].
The attack model intends to learn from the differences in the
target model’s output by feeding in pristine or bogus training
data. In this paper, we adapt the membership inference attack
for the task of audio auditing. Specifically, instead of inferring
the record-level membership, we aim to infer the participant-
level membership. That is, we focus on whether a particular
user had unwillingly contributed data to train an ASR model.
Our work differs from another user-level membership audit
[12], as the features extracted from the outputs of developed
ASR models are three pieces of audio related information
including: transcription text, text probability, and frame length,
rather than words’ rank lists.
III. AUDITING THE ASR MODEL
In this section, we first formalize our objective for auditing
automatic speech recognition models. Secondly, we present
how an audio auditor can be constructed. Finally, we outline
how the auditor is used for auditing the target model.
A. Problem Definition
As shown in Figure 1, we describe the workflow of audio
transcription using an ASR system. By querying an ASR
system with an audio sample of a recorded speech, the speech
recognition model outputs pseudo-posterior probabilities for
all context-dependent phonetic units. During the decoding
step, the probabilities are used to infer the most probable text
sequence.
Suppose there is a group of audio recordings Dtar from a set
of individuals Utar . Our target model is an speech recognition
model denoted as ftar which is trained on Dtar using a
learning algorithm Altar . For a specific user u, our objective
is to find out whether this user is in the target model’s training
set, such that u ∈ Utar . The participant-level membership
inference against ftar requires an auxiliary reference dataset
Dre f to build the audio auditor. Specifically, Dre f is used to
train several shadow models fshd which simulate the target
model ftar in approximation. We denote Ure f the set of all
users in Dre f . By querying fshd , the transcription outputs are
properly labeled depending on the audio speaker belonging to
Ure f or not.
Finally, we assume that our auditor only has black-box
access to the target model. Given an input audio recording, the
auditor can only obtain the text transcription and its probability
as outputs. Neither the training data nor the training parameters
and hyper-parameters of the target model is known to the
auditor. We assume that our auditor knows any learning al-
gorithm used in the ASR system, including feature extraction,
the training algorithm, and the decoding algorithm.
Threat Model. We assume that our auditor only has black-box
access to the target model. Given an input audio recording, the
auditor can only obtain the text transcription and its probability
as outputs. Neither the training data nor the training parameters
and hyper-parameters of the target model is known to the
auditor. The state-of-the-art algorithms for typical DNN-HMM
3Fig. 2: Auditing an ASR model. (1) In the training process, we sample n datasets from the auxiliary reference dataset Dre f as
Dshd1, . . . ,Dshdn to build n shadow models. Each shadow model dataset Dtrainshdi , i = 1, . . . , n is split to a training set D
train
shdi
and a testing set Dtest
shdi
. Then we query the shadow model with Dtest
shdi
and a subset of Dtrain
shdi
and label their outputs with
“member” and “nonmember”. With some preprocessing methods, the audit model can be trained with these outputs. (2) In
the auditing process, we randomly sample a particular speaker’s (u′s) audios from Dusers to query our target ASR model.
With the same preprocessing methods, the outputs can be passed to the audit model to determine whether u ∈ Utar .
ASR systems are well-known and standard [17], [20], [21]. We
hereby assume that our auditor knows any learning algorithm
used in the ASR system, including feature extraction, the
training algorithm, and the decoding algorithm. Due to recent
research on model stealing [22], [23] which extracts network
parameters from querying the output, it is reasonable to offer
the auditor black-box access to the Machine Learning as a
Service (i.e., the ASR model).
B. Overview of the Audio Auditor
The nature of membership inference [19] is to learn the
difference of a model fed with its actual training samples
and other samples. Thus, to audit whether an ASR model had
been trained with a user’s audio data or not, the auditor’s task
can be transferred as inferring this user’s membership in this
ASR model’s training dataset. The audio auditor’s training and
auditing processes are depicted in Figure 2. We assume that
our target model’s dataset Dtar is disjoint from the auxiliary
reference dataset Dre f (Dtar ∩ Dre f = ∅). In addition, Ure f
and Utar are also disjoint (Utar ∩Ure f = ∅).
The primary task to train an audio auditor is to build up
several shadow models to infer the targeted ASR model’s
decision boundary. We assume all learning algorithms Altar
are known to the auditor; therefore, the learning algorithms
for the shadow model are known accordingly (Alshd = Altar ).
Different from the target model, we have full knowledge of
the shadow models’ ground truth. For a user u querying the
model with her audio samples, if u ∈ Dtrain
shdi
, we collapse the
features extracted from these samples’ results into one record
and label it as “member”; otherwise, “nonmember”. Taken
all together with these labeled records (processed), a training
dataset is set to train a binary classifier as the audit model
using a supervised learning algorithm. As also evidenced in
[19], the more shadow models built, the more accurate the
audit model performed.
As shown in Figure 2, n datasets are sampled from
Dre f to train n shadow models with Alshd . The testing
set and the subset of training set are used to query each
shadow model. The query outputs are preprocessed below.
For participant-level membership, some users’ pertinent char-
acters are extracted from each output, including the tran-
scription text (denoted as TXT), the posterior probability
(denoted as Probability), and the audio frame length (denoted
as Frame Length). The features of the auditor’s training
set are written as: {TXT1=type(string), Probability1=type(float),
Frame_Length1=type(integer), . . . , TXTn=type(txt), Probabili-
tyn=type(float), Frame_Lengthn=type(integer), class}, where n is
the number of audios belonging to a speaker. To process
categorical features, such as the TXT features, we map the
text to integers using a label encoder [24]. The built auditor
determines whether u ∈ Utar or not by the processed outputs.
4Fig. 3: Target Model Fig. 4: Shadow Model 1 Fig. 5: Shadow Model 2
Exploring alternative preprocessing methods, such as a one-
hot encoder, will be an avenue for future research.
IV. EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS
A. Dataset
As a proof-of-concept, we aim to build up one target model
and design two shadow models based on this target model. As
mentioned in Section III-B, we curated three disjoint datasets
from the TIMIT speech corpus as listed in Table I. See more
details in Appendix A. In this experiment, we trained two
shadow models on Dtrain
shdi
(i = 1, 2) with a similar distribution
to Dtraintar . Training with differently distributed datasets will be
our future research.
TABLE I: Datasets across models
MODEL TRAINING DATASET TESTING DATASET
TARGET 154 SPEAKERS,1232 AUDIO
54 SPEAKERS,
432 AUDIOS
SHADOW1 154 SPEAKERS,1232 AUDIO
57 SPEAKERS,
456 AUDIOS
SHADOW2 154 SPEAKERS,1232 AUDIO
57 SPEAKERS,
456 AUDIOS
The outputs of our two shadow models are used to train
the audit model. By querying the shadow model with all its
testing set and one-third of its training set, we processed their
outputs and labeled them as “nonmember” and “member”,
respectively. Since the training datasets for all three models
include eight sentences for each speaker, the feature set of the
auditor’s training dataset is {TXT1, Probability1, Frame_Length1,
. . . , TXT8, Probability8, Frame_Length8, class}. To audit the
target model, a speaker may query the auditor model from
one to eight pieces of audios. When a user audits the target
model less than eight pieces of audios, we pad zeros to all the
missing feature values.
B. Target Model
Our target model is a speech-to-text model. The inputs are a
set of audio files with phonetic text as labels, while the outputs
are the transcribed phonetic texts with final probabilities and
the corresponding input frame length. To simulate most of the
current ASR models in the real world, we created a state-of-art
DNN-HMM-based ASR model [17] using the PyTorch-Kaldi
Speech Recognition Toolkit [18]. In the preprocessing step,
MFCC features are used to train the model with the multilayer
perceptron (MLP) algorithm. The training epoch is 24. The
outputs of this MLP model are decoded and rescored with
the probabilities of the HMM and n-gram language model to
obtain the transcription. A decision tree is used for the audit
model. See more details in Appendix A.
To evaluate the target model’s performance, we use the
training accuracy and validation accuracy as shown in Fig-
ure 3. Comparing the training accuracy performed by two
shadow models and our target model, the trends are sim-
ilar and the accuracy curve can ultimately reach 70% (see
Figures 3, 4, 5). This indicates that our shadow models can
successfully mimic the target model (same transcription on the
same audio inputs), or are able to achieve the same utility, i.e.,
speech recognition (same transcription accuracy, not the same
input samples between models.)
C. Results
To evaluate the auditor’s performance, four metrics are
calculated from the confusion matrix, including accuracy,
precision, recall, and F1-score. True Positive (TP): the number
of records we predicted as “member” are correctly labelled.
True Negative (TN): the number of records we predicted as
“nonmember” are correctly labelled. False Positive (FP): the
number of records we predicted as “member” are incorrectly
labelled. False Negative (FN): the number of records we
predicted as “nonmember” are incorrectly labelled:
• Accuracy: the percentage of records correctly classified
by the audit model.
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
5• Recall: the percentage of all true “member” records
correctly determined as “member”.
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
• Precision: the percentage of records correctly determined
as “member” by the audit model among all records
determined as “member”.
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
• F1-score: the harmonic mean of precision and recall.
F1 − score = 2 × Recall × Precision
Recall + Precision
We show results for the behavior of the auditor under two
different circumstances: when the number of users in the
training dataset is varied, and when the number of the audio
samples from the user to be audited is varied. Four metrics
are calculated from the confusion matrix including accuracy,
precision, recall, and F1-score.
TABLE II: The confusion matrix for the auditor.
CLASS ACTUAL:
MEMBER
ACTUAL:
NONMEMBER
PREDICTED:
MEMBER
TP FP
PREDICTED:
NONMEMBER
FN TN
Effect of the number of users used in training dataset.
The audit model’s behavior when training sets containing
different numbers of users is depicted in Figure 6. We trained
the audit model with 25, 50, 75, 100, 125, and 150 users
that were randomly sampled from the outputs of two shadow
models. The testing set querying these audit models is fixed
at 78 test audio records. To eliminate trial specific deviations,
we repeated each experiment 10 times and averaged the
results. The audit model performs fairly well for all metrics,
with all metrics under different configurations above or
approximately 85%. The model performs better when the
number of users within the training set increases. When 100
users used in training set size, the performance reached a
highest score especially in accuracy (approximately 93%) and
F1-score (approximately 95%). When the number of users
increased to 125, both two metrics’ results slightly drop but
raise back while the number of users increased to 150. In all
configurations, the audit model performs well. Herein, the
more users that are used to train the audit model, the more
accurate a user’s membership within the target model can
be determined. With regards to the performance of the audit
model when training with an even larger number of users
of the training dataset, we will consider this problem in our
future work.
Effect of the number of audio records for each user used
in querying the auditor. Since we randomly sample a user’s
audio to test our audit model, the number of audio samples
Fig. 6: The audit model’s performance across the training set
size.
Fig. 7: The audit model’s performance by the number of audios
for one speaker.
for this user may not be the same as the number of audios
for each user in the auditor’s training dataset. That is, the
number of non-zero features of an audit query may vary. We
evaluate the effect on auditor’s performance using a variable
number of audio samples from each user in auditing. Herein,
the number of users used in different testing sets are the same
and #{u ∈ Utar } : #{u < Utar } = 2 : 1. To gather a different
number of non-zero features in audit model’s testing dataset,
we queried the target model with 78 users where each user was
randomly sampled from one to eight test audio records. Like
the experiment above, we repeated the experiment 100 times
6and averaged these results to reduce deviations in performance.
The results are displayed in Figure 7. The more audios for
each user used to audit their membership, the more accurate
our audio auditor performed. When the user audits the target
model with only one audio, the audit model’s performance is
relatively low — except the accuracy approaches to 50% — the
other three metrics’ results are around 25%. When the number
of audio reaches eight, all performance results are above 90%.
V. CONCLUSION
This work highlights, and leaves open, the potential of
mounting participant-level membership inference attack in
IoT voice services. While our work has yet to examine the
attack success rate on various IoT applications across multiple
learning models, they do narrow the gap towards defining
clear membership privacy in the user level, rather than the
record level [19] which leaves questions about whether the
privacy leakage hails from the data distribution or its intrinsic
uniqueness of the record. Nevertheless, as we argued, both the
size of user base and the number of audio samples per user
used in the testing set have shown to have a positive effect on
the IoT audit model. Examining other factors on performance
and extending possible defenses against audit are all worth
further exploration.
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7APPENDIX
DEEP LEARNING FOR ACOUSTIC MODELS
Deep learning methods are used to build up acoustic models,
such as speech transcription [25], word spotting or triggering
[26], speaker identification or verification [27]. With super-
vised learning, a neural network can be trained as a classifier
using a softmax across the phonetic units. A feature stream
of audio is the input of the network in deep learning, while
the output should be a posterior probability for the predicted
phonetic states. Subsequently, these output representations
will be decoded by the HMM-based decoder and will be
mapping to possible sequences of phonetic texts with different
probabilities.
Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) is one of the DNN algorithms
used in this work. Assume that MLP is a stack of L layers of
logistic regression models, fl(·) represents the active function
in the lth layer. Given an input zl ∈ Rml , where ml is the
number of neurons in the lth layer, this layer’s output outl
can be formalized as:
outl = fl(zl) = fl(W l · outl−1 + bl), (1)
where W l ∈ Rml×m(l−1) represents the weight matrix, and bl
is the bias from the (l − 1)th to lth layer. Specifically, we
applied the sigmoid function in the hidden layers and used the
softmax activation function for the final output layer. As for
the loss function, the MLP uses the cross-entropy. Moreover,
the MLP tunes the parameters using the error back-propagation
procedure (BP) and the stochastic gradient descent method.
In the case of building the ASR system with DNN-HMM
algorithms, the posterior probability output in the output layer
can be expressed as {P(ρ1 |ot ), . . . , P(ρk |ot )}, where k is the
total number of phonemes corresponding to the number of the
Lth layer’s output nodes. This is a set of posterior probabilities
of each phoneme in the tth time frame ot of the audio input.
The posterior probability of each phoneme (i.e., P(ρk |ot )) is
transferred and processed by the HMM-based decoder:
bj = P(ot |sj) =
I∑
i=1
cji
P(ρi |ot )
P(ρi) . (2)
In Equation 2, bj is the probability of phonemes in the time
frame ot mapping to j th HMM state sj based on continuous
Probability Density Functions (PDFs) [28]. Herein, I is a fixed
number of PDFs, and c is the weight for each phoneme.
OVERVIEW OF AUDIO AUDITOR
To build up n shadow models (see Figure 2), we sam-
ple n datasets from the auxiliary reference dataset Dre f as
Dshd1, . . . ,Dshdn, n > 1. Further, we split each shadow model
dataset Dtrain
shdi
, i = 1, . . . , n into training set Dtrain
shdi
and testing
set Dtest
shdi
. Dtrain
shdi
is used to train the shadow model with Alshd ,
while Dtest
shdi
is used to evaluate its performance. To generate
the training set with ground truth for the audit model, we query
the shadow model with Dquery
shdi
obtaining all samples in Dtest
shdi
and a subset of Dtrain
shdi
which are sampled randomly.
Each shadow model fshdi , i = 1, . . . , n is trained with Alshd
using Dtrain
shdi
. For a user u querying the model with their audio
samples, if u ∈ Dtrain
shdi
, we combine the features extracted
from these samples’ results into one record and label it as
“member”; otherwise, we label this record as “nonmember”.
The labels combined together with the outputs from the
shadow models, form the training dataset for our audit model.
As for the auditing process, we randomly sample one or a
few audios recorded by one speaker u from Dusers to query
our target ASR model. These sampled audios are transcribed
into text with some outputs. To audit whether the target model
had used this speaker’s audio in its training phase, we analyze
these transcription outputs as part of a testing record with our
audio auditor. Feature extraction and preprocessing methods
used in this testing record are the same as the methods used
for shadow models’ results. The auditor finally classifies this
testing record as “member” or “nonmember” and hence
determines whether u ∈ Utar or not.
The TIMIT speech corpus contains 6,300 sentence spo-
ken by 630 speakers from 8 major dialect regions of the
United States. Three kinds of sentences are recorded including
the dialect sentences, the phonetically-compact sentences and
the phonetically-diverse sentences. The dialect sentences are
spoken by all speakers from different dialect regions. The
phonetically-compact sentences were recorded with a good
coverage of pairs of phones, while the phonetically-diverse
audios recorded the sentence selected from different corpus
for diverse sentence types and phonetic contexts.
We selected three disjoint datasets from TIMIT speech
corpus manually as described in Table I. Specifically, each
training dataset and testing dataset obtains the audio recorded
by speakers from 8 dialect regions. In addition, each subset
dataset contains all three kinds of audios that mentioned
above. The diversity of audios within each dataset not only is
more similar to the reality ASR model’s training set, but also
remains some users’ information for participant-level auditing
task.
During the audio input’s preprocessing step, we utilize the
Kaldi Toolkit [29] to extract MFCC features for each audio
of waveform. The force alignment among features and phone
states were used to process the label. To prepare a training set,
we applied a simple DNN algorithm — multilayer perceptron
(MLP) to learn the relationship between the input audios and
the output transcriptions. As for the hyperparameters in the
MLP model, we set up 4 hidden layers and 1,024 hidden
neurons per layer. The learning rate was set at 8%, the model
was trained with 24 epochs. The output of this MLP model is
a set of pseudo-posteriors probabilities of all possible phonetic
units. These outputs are normalized and then fed into a HMM-
based encoder. After encoding, an n-gram language model was
applied to rescore the probabilities. The final transcription is
the text sequence with the highest final probability.
